模範生的迷惘：邊陲歷史學家、「中國現代化的區域研究」計畫、與變動中的冷戰知識政治
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※中文演講
Abstract：
In 1973, the Institute of Modernization History at Academia Sinica launched an ambitious project to examine late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China through the lens of modernization theory. Over the next sixteen years, seventeen historians each focused on a single province in what became the “Modernization of China: A Regional Study” (中國現代化的區域研究). Although it was one of the largest and most well-founded collaborative projects in the field, more than half of its findings were never published. Despite its status as a defining legacy of the Institute, some participants later dismissed it as a “completely pointless” endeavor.
Why did these historians, operating at the margins of American epistemic hegemony, initially embrace the project with enthusiasm but ultimately withhold much of their work? This talk situates the project within the broader context of Cold War knowledge production in East Asia. It argues that both the project’s formation and its frustrations were shaped by the interplay of local and international politics, the IMH’s institutional environment, critiques of social science theories in the United States, and shifting scholarly expectations for studying modern China from the 1970s to the early 1990s. At the same time, intellectual and political constraints during the final years of Taiwan’s Martial Law, along with fickle academic trends in late Cold War America, influenced how participants evaluated their work. By examining these dynamics, this study invites reflection on how we define the “success” of research projects.
Abstract：
In 1973, the Institute of Modernization History at Academia Sinica launched an ambitious project to examine late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China through the lens of modernization theory. Over the next sixteen years, seventeen historians each focused on a single province in what became the “Modernization of China: A Regional Study” (中國現代化的區域研究). Although it was one of the largest and most well-founded collaborative projects in the field, more than half of its findings were never published. Despite its status as a defining legacy of the Institute, some participants later dismissed it as a “completely pointless” endeavor.
Why did these historians, operating at the margins of American epistemic hegemony, initially embrace the project with enthusiasm but ultimately withhold much of their work? This talk situates the project within the broader context of Cold War knowledge production in East Asia. It argues that both the project’s formation and its frustrations were shaped by the interplay of local and international politics, the IMH’s institutional environment, critiques of social science theories in the United States, and shifting scholarly expectations for studying modern China from the 1970s to the early 1990s. At the same time, intellectual and political constraints during the final years of Taiwan’s Martial Law, along with fickle academic trends in late Cold War America, influenced how participants evaluated their work. By examining these dynamics, this study invites reflection on how we define the “success” of research projects.